INTRODUCTION
Levhari and Mirman [5] consider an infinite horizon economy with a single renewable resource. In [5] , two countries fish in a common ocean. The fish population reproduces in accordance with the usual neoclassical production function. Each country has a utility function, and there is a discount factor common to both. It is shown that the Cournot-Nash noncooperative duopoly equilibrium is in general not Pareto optimal.
In this paper the cooperative solution for the same model with a finite number of agents is considered. We seek consumption programs that are maximal and satisfy some fairness criterion. The main result is that any maximal program is globally asymptotically stable in that the value of capital stock (fish population) monotonically approaches the "golden-rule" value E (that is, f'(2) = l//3, wherefis the production function and ,8 the discount rate) and the consumption of the ith agent monotonically approaches some fixed value tI& where Bi >, 0, XT=, f$ = 1 (here 2 = f(Z) -I is the "golden rule" consumption, and n is the number of agents). Conversely, there is exactly one maximal program corresponding to any distribution of limiting consumption. Fairness then consists in a reasonable choice of limiting consumptions. If the agents are thought of as individuals, equal limiting consumptions would seem appropriate. If they represent countries, the limiting shares could be chosen proportional to population. In this way each individual could receive an equal limiting share of consumption. The allocations characterized by these definitions of fairness are not in general envy-free.
However, in the undiscounted case (/3 = 1) it is shown that our definition of fairness is the only one that guarantees that envy will be finite, that is, the utility an agent could receive from someone else's consumption stream can exceed the utility he actually receives by at most a finite amount.
The second and third sections of this paper characterize the maximal states of a one-sector growth model. The model differs from the standard models in this area since there are many agents (countries). For the proof of existence, our model can be reduced to a case that requires the maximization of a single social utility function-an appropriate positive linear combination of the individual utlities. This is possible since any maximal allocation for the single function is maximal for the entire economy. The existence theorem of Gale [4] or Brock [l] then may be applied. However, this type of argument cannot be used to answer the uniqueness question. In the undiscounted case, there is no guarantee that a maximal allocation for the economy is maximal with respect to any weighted average of the agents' utility functions. (The reason for this is, essentially, that given any sequence {a:}, t = 1,2,..., i = l,..., n, lim inf,,, '& uti > CF=, lim inf,,, at and the inequality may be strict.) Thus the identification of maximal programs with limiting consumptions, the object of Section 2, must be carried out directly. Although a literature on the uniqueness of optimal paths is available (the one-sector case is covered in [3] ; a more general treatment is offered in [2] ), it can only be applied to assert uniqueness of maximal programs that that result from maximizing a single function. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show that every efficient program can be viewed as a maximal program derived from a single function.
The,existence of a fair efficient allocation is not in contrast to analogous finite models. For example, any competitive equilibrium for a pure exchange economy in which every agent is assigned an equal share of the initial resources is Pareto optimal and envy-free. Indeed, if the discount factor is less than one, and the model is treated as a private ownership economy with agents sharing profits equally, then any competitive equilibrium is efficient and envy-free. This is true only because there is no labor input in the production process. In more general economies with production fair and efficient allocations need not exist (an example is given in Es]).
It is normally not the case that the fair efficient allocation is unique. There is no reason to expect a unique competitive allocation in an equal income economy. Thus, what is special about the model presented here is that the equitable allocation is completely determined by the requirements of maximality and finite envy.
The reason for the distinction between the discounted and undiscounted cases is that the competitive equilibrum problem is well posed only when /3 < 1. Since output remains bounded, the discounted sum of individual utilities is finite, and it is not difficult to modify standard arguments to show existence and optimality of competitive allocations when each agent receives a share of the profits from the (fish) production process. Thus the infinite horizon economy with /3 < 1 behaves essentially like a finite economy.
When there is no discounting the situation is altered considerably. The fact that there is no envy-free maximal allocation means that the equal shares competitive allocation does not exist. Since utility and profits are unbounded, this fact is not surprising. However, the positive result-the existence of a unique maximal allocation with finite envy-is satisfactory. If we interpret the undiscounted infinite horizon model as an idealization of finite horizon models we can assert that all efficient envy-free allocations for finite models (having sufficient periods) yield nearly equal final period consumption.
I. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
There are n agents. Each agent i has a utility function for consumption, ui : (0, co) + R. ui is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Denote lim,,, ui(c) and lim,,, u:(c) by ~~(0) and u:(O), respectively. These values need not be finite. A discount factor /3 E (0, l] is common to all consumers.
The technology is described by a twice continuously differentiable function f: [0, co) -+ [0, co) with f(0) = 0. We assume that f'(x) > 0 > f"(x) for all x. We also assume that f'(x) > l/p for some x > 0, and that f(2) = k for some f > 0. It then follows that there is a unique X E (0,s) satisfying f'(X) = l//?. Let C = f(Z) -X. Notice C > /3j(x) -x whenever x # X.
A program is a sequence {(xt ; rJ}T=, with xt 3 0, yt = (Q,..., ctn), cti > 0 for all i and t. Let ct = xi"=, cl. A program {(xt ; rt)} is called feasible if, for some x0 > 0, ct = f(xtJ -xt for t 3 1. We assume throughout that all programs start from a fixed x,, > 0.
A 
II. UNIQUENESS OF MAXIMAL PROGRAMS
The purpose of this section is to show that for every distribution of limiting consumption there is at most one maximal program. To do this we restrict attention to programs satisfying a condition necessary for maximality. Therefore, since y,, > x,, , 9 > y0 implies yt increases to some 3 E (x, , 91. Furthermore, 9 = SC(y) so 9 = 3. If y,, > 9 a similar argument shows that yt decreases to 9. g Lemma 2.1 can be used to establish the boundedness of feasible programs. Proof. Let y, = f( yt-J, y,, = x,, . By Lemma 2.1, yt converges monotonically to f, and hence yt < xM for all t. Also, for any feasible program xt < yt for all t. This follows by induction since x,, = y0 and if x, < y, for some s, then
Therefore, xt < yt < xM for t 3 0. Since ct < f(xt-r) by feasibility, it follows that and the lemma is established. 1 LEMMA 2.3. Let {(xt ; yJ} be afeasibleprogram and let c E (0, f (x,) -x,). Suppose xt < X for all t. Then there is an s such that c, 3 c.
Proof. Let y, = x,, , yt = gC( yt& Pick T so that y, > X. This is possible by Lemma 2.1. Suppose ct < c for t >, 1. Since Xt = f(xt-3 -Ct 3 f(xt-3 -c it follows, by induction, that xt > y, for t >, 0. In particular, xr > yr. > X, contradicting xT < X Hence c, > c for some s. 1 The idea of the proof of the uniqueness theorem is to exploit two necessary conditions. The first, given in the following lemma, is just the usual relationship between an individual's intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. It will be used to show that maximal programs converge. That knowledge will lead us to a boundary condition relating the marginal utilities of different agents. The feasible program {(xt ; rt)} is called admissible if it satisfies conditions (1) and (2) above, for every i and t. By Lemma 2.4 we can restrict attention to admissible programs. Our next result guarantees that admissible programs converge. To complete the proof it suffices to show that f < X is impossible. In order to get a contradiction, assume 3i: < f. Let q be chosen so that /3f'(xt) > 1 + 6 for all t > q and some 6 > 0. If xt < Z for t > 0, then (rt} is nondecreasing and, by Lemma 2. We have now restricted possible efficient programs to those that converge. Proposition 2.6 guarantees that the limiting consumption will be positive. Since 2, > ct for t > T we can choose jjt = (&l,..., Ztn) such that CT=, c",i = Et and c"i > ~2 for every i. Therefore {(& ; ft)} dominates {(xt ; rt)}, contradicting maximality. 1
Taken together, the last two results demonstrate that all maximal programs are globally asymptotically stable. PROPOSITION 2.7 . Suppose {(x, ; yt)} is an admissible program such that lim -t-VW xt -x. Then ((xt ; yt)} is a monotone sequence, increasing if x, < X, constant if x, = X, and decreasing $x0 > X.
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from (2.1) and (2.2). 1
In order to show that a given distribution of limiting consumption can correspond to no more than one maximal program we must relate period t consumption to limiting consumption. In order to do this we introduce Mij = u~(~,E)/u;(e,c) for 1 < i, j < ~1. Clearly 0 < Mii < co and MijMik = Mik . The fact that the limiting ratio of marginal utilities is related to the ratios in period t will guarantee that no two maximal programs will yield the same limiting consumption.
If {(x, ; yt)) is an admissible program with lim,,,(x, ; yt) = (X; ~6) then and thus ck > F. 1
We now are prepared to prove the main result of this section.
THEOREM 2.9. There is at most one maximal program {(xt ; yt)} starting from x, such that lim,,, yt = 8. 
III. EXISTENCE OF MAXIMAL PROGRAMS
The purpose of this section is to prove that maximal programs exist. It turns out that this is an easy consequence of the existence of maximal programs in economies with a single utility-maximizing agent. The function U we choose is defined by n Uj(Ci) U(c) = max 2 ) j=l u,(Q) subject to ci > 0, i 13 = C.
i=l Clearly, U is continuous and strictly concave. Also, since each ui is strictly concave, every c > 0 determines a unique vector y(c) = (cl,..., c") such that ci >, 0, c = C 8, and U(c) = C (ui(ci)/u;(O,?)). We call {(xt , ct)> a feasible sequence (from x,) if xt >, 0, ct > 0, and ct = f(xt-,) -xt for all t 3 1. Thus, associated with every feasible sequence ((xt ; ct)} is a feasible program KG ; cd> where yt = Y(G). It is not surprising that efficient allocations can be generated by an appropriately weighted sum of individual utilities. The relationships among efficient allocations, weighted averages of utilities, and competitive equilibria are well known (see, for example, [6] ). In this case the situation is altered somewhat because (when p = 1) competitive equilibria may not exist.
For reference we state Lemma 3.1 is the standard existence theorem, well known in the theory of optimal growth. Proofs can be found (for the case /3 = 1) in Brock [I] or Gale [4] .
We can now prove 
IV. FAIR ALLOCATIONS
The results of Sections II and III show that there is a unique maximal program corresponding to every limiting distribution of consumption. This section discusses the properties of maximal programs, with emphasis on that program which gives equal shares to each agent in the limit.
Throughout this section we assume p = 1. It is necessary to distinguish between the /3 < 1 and the Ramsey case because when /3 < 1 the utility stream received by an agent is finite and the fact that an agent's envy is finite is of no interest. Furthermore, the maximal allocation with equal limiting shares of consumption need not be free from envy (as Theorem 4.5 shows) while in the p < 1 case the envy-free allocations exist by analogy to finite horizon models. 
Hence The next result guarantees that the maximal program giving each agent limiting consumption z/n is almost envy-free, in that each individual receives -up to a finite amount-as much utility from his consumption sequence as from that of any one else. Clearly, no other maximal allocation will have this property; with any other limiting consumptions there would be a T and an E > 0 such that, for some i and j and all t 2 T, Agent j would then prefer i's consumption to his own by an infinite amount. Unless the agents have identical utility functions, no maximal allocation is guaranteed to be envy-free. In fact, the following theorem implies that in many circumstances there exists i andj such that It > C$ for all t. THEOREM 4.5. Suppose {(X, ; yt)} is a maximal program and lirntem jjt = q/n,..., I/n). Zf, for some i and j, Ui = g 0 uj where g is continuously dQ$rentiable, increasing, and concave then (1) Zf x0 < I, then Eti > Eti whenever E,i > 0. u;m 1 u,lo= g'(u,(+z)) u~(?/n) = g'(@/n)) @8j) < AXE,'> 1 qqj\r--.= 'i(',') g'(qm * Hence g'(u&,f)) < g'(u&z) and thus csf 2 E/n, by the concavity of g. This contradiction establishes (1) . (2) follows from a similar argument and the observation that if x, > X then ct > 0 for all t. 1 We can interpret this theorem in the following way. The more concave (risk averse) an agent's utility function, the more he prefers to have consumption restricted to a small interval. Since consumption in the maximal program is monotone, the most concave agent will receive more than the others when x, < E and less when x, > X.
It is easy to see that unless ui = auj + b for some a > 0, ui = g 0 ui for some increasing g, where either g or g-l is strictly concave over some interval. Therefore, provided two agents have different preferences, there is a production function and an initial stock x, that guarantees that some agent consumes more in every period than another agent in the maximal program with equal limiting consumptions.
